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Katrina M. Wyman

SECOND GENERATION PROPERTY RIGHTS
ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
Almost six decades ago, Ronald Coase suggested the potential for
property rights and markets to address environmental problems in The Problem of
Social Cost.1 Today, there are many examples of property-based policy
instruments, such as cap and trade programs, dealing with issues ranging from
conventional air pollution to greenhouse gas emissions, overfishing, habitat
protection, and allocating scarce freshwater.2 These examples come not only from
the U.S. and other developed countries, but also from emerging powers such as
China which is piloting water trading and carbon cap and trade regimes.3
For decades, Coasean-inspired scholarship, advocating greater use of
property rights and markets, has focused on important “first generation” issues
related to establishing property rights. These first generation issues include: the
ideal characteristics of environmental property rights (e.g., must they be perpetual
or will time-limited rights suffice to eliminate the tragedy of the commons?4), how
property rights should be initially allocated (through auctions, grandfathering or
some other method), and the external pre-conditions that are necessary to establish
rights (e.g., how important is it to have a sovereign authority enforcing the rights,
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1. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
2. For examples of the use of “private property” to address environmental problems, see, e.g.,
JASON A. SCHWARTZ, MARKETABLE PERMITS: RECOMMENDATIONS ON APPLICATIONS AND
MANAGEMENT 7-14 (2017). Schwartz disclaims use of the “property rights” label, preferring to use the
term “permits” and “licenses.” Id. at 6. I use the terms “property” and “private property” loosely in this
article to refer to legal instruments that provide individuals with an exclusive right to something; not all
of the interests I am labeling property are legally treated like private property, many are more like
licenses and permits. See infra note 77 (prior appropriation water rights can be protected by the Takings
Clause, while grazing permits are not, and individual transferable quotas likely are not protected by the
Takings Clause); Bryan Leonard et al., Water Market Design, Transaction Costs, and the Political
Economy of Property Rights to Natural Resources, REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming)
(citations are to Sept. 21, 2017 draft, available online.).
3. Chris Buckley, Xi Jinping Is Set for a Big Gamble With China’s Carbon Trading Market, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2017; Duston Garrick & Jesper Svensson, The Political Economy of Water Markets: 40
Years of Debates, Experiments and Lessons Learned, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WATER POLITICS
AND POLICY 376, 394-97 (2017); David Lewis & Hang Zheng, How Could Water Markets Like
Australia’s Work in China?, 34 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. (2018).
4. Corbett A. Grainger & Dominic P. Parker, The Political Economy of Fishery Reform, 5 ANN.
REV. RESOURCE ECON. 369, 380-81 (2013) (resource economists advocate perpetual rights).
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or can they be implemented in areas like the high seas without such an enforcement
authority?5 Is it easier to establish rights in small or large number situations?6).
With property rights now established as a tool for addressing
environmental problems, the time is ripe to think about what might be called
“second generation” environmental property rights issues. Second generation issues
are the issues that arise after tradable property rights have been established in a
resource. Foremost among these is the risk that property rights get stuck in the
hands of owners who are not using the underlying resource for a highly socially
valuable purpose. For example, many grazing permits are now held by ranchers
who use the permits to graze on federal lands. Yet, little meat comes from the
animals that they graze and the grazing further degrades the already depleted
federal lands. From a societal perspective, it would be preferable if grazing permits
were retired so that federal lands could be allowed to regenerate, but
conservationists have not been able to buy up many permits in order to retire them.7
Another risk is that a group of “rentiers” come to own many of the property rights
in a resource, and profit from leasing out those rights to others who do the physical
work of extracting the resource, such as harvesting fish.8 While leasing may be
economically efficient, resource users may see it as unfair that they have to pay
rent to extract a resource, especially if the property owners that the users are paying
initially acquired the rights for free, as in many fisheries with catch shares.9
This article makes two main points. First, it highlights the potential for
things to go awry after property rights have been established in environmental
resources. It is not enough to establish property rights in water, marine fisheries, or
grazing on federal lands because, once established, rights can become inefficiently
or inequitably allocated over time, even if the rights are legally alienable. In
emphasizing that property rights may become misallocated, this article draws on
the theoretical arguments recently advanced by Eric Posner, Glen Weyl, and Lee
Fennell that private property can lead to allocative inefficiency.10 Although there
are problems with their critiques of private property and reform proposals, there is
no doubt that they are correct that there are instances where property rights are
misallocated.11 Second, this article highlights three categories of explanations for
why environmental property rights are not sufficient to promote socially desirable
5. Compare Christopher Costello et al., Conservation Science: A Market Proposal to Saving the
Whales, 481 NATURE 139 (2012), with Holly Doremus, Why International Catch Shares Won’t Save
Ocean Biodiversity, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 385 (2013).
6. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR RIGHTS 21-22 (1990).
7. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (citing John D. Leshy & Molly S. McUsic,
Where’s the Beef – Facilitating Voluntary Retirement of Federal Lands from Livestock Grazing, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 368 (2008)).
8. Rentier, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2009), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
162547?redirectedFrom=rentier#eid (defining a rentier as “[a] person who derives his or her income
from property or investment.”).
9. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
10. ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY (2018) [hereinafter POSNER & WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS]; Eric A.
Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 51
(2017); Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016).
11. Katrina M. Wyman, In Defense of the Fee Simple, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2017).
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outcomes, with a view towards stimulating more thought on ways that
misallocations might be addressed. These three categories of explanations are the
incompleteness of environmental property rights, the transaction costs that
complicate trading them, and government subsidies for resource extraction.
Underlying all of these explanations are the political difficulties of reform and the
characteristics of environmental resources that make them hard to propertize as
completely as land. The article concludes briefly by emphasizing the need to move
beyond advocating more property rights to identifying options for addressing the
problems with the environmental property rights that now exist.
After decades of advocacy urging the establishment of environmental
property rights, it is an opportune time for scholars to holistically take stock of the
second generation problems encountered in existing environmental property rights.
To be sure, natural resource economists, legal experts, and others have previously
taken note of inefficiencies, and to some extent inequities, in the distribution of
property rights in water,12 grazing permits,13 and fisheries catch shares,14 and this
article draws on this existing scholarship. However, the existing analyses of
problematic misallocations of property rights tend to focus on the misallocations of
water rights, fisheries catch shares, or grazing permits, specifically, and not on
environmental property rights generally. They do not tend to recognize, as Posner
& Weyl have recently highlighted, that ensuring that property rights remain
efficiently and equitably allocated over time is a generic challenge for all property
rights, and accordingly, one that applies to environmental property rights like other
forms of property rights.15 The “ongoing allocative challenge” of preserving
dynamic efficiency and fairness is an issue that deserves more systematic attention
in the literature on environmental property rights.
1.

THE PROBLEM OF MISALLOCATIONS

Private property is an age-old tool for allocating responsibility for
resources such as land. In the 1960s and 1970s, influenced by the work of Coase,
economists began promoting the use of property rights and markets as an
alternative to command and control government regulation to protect the
environment.16 For many environmentalists in the 1970s and 1980s, the idea of
12. See, e.g., Peter W. Culp et al., Shopping for Water: How the Market Can Mitigate Water
Shortages in the American West 10-12 (The Hamilton Project & Stanford Woods Institute for the
Environment, Discussion Paper No. 2014-052014, 2014); Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 3-4; Gary D.
Libecap, Water Rights and Markets in the U.S. Semiarid West, in DANIEL H. COLE & ELINOR OSTROM
EDS., PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 389, 396, 398-99 (2012).
13. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 378.
14. There is considerable evidence of the economic benefits of fishery catch shares, and some
evidence that they have environmental benefits. See, e.g., Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares
Prevent Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCI. 1678, 1678 (2008). For an example of a critique of a Canadian
catch share program, see Evelyn Pinkerton & Danielle N. Edwards, The Elephant in the Room: The
Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas, 33 MARINE POL’Y 707, 708 (2009).
15. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Leonard et al., supra note 2 (analyzing the obstacles to surface
water markets in the U.S. west, drawing “parallels” with markets “for fishing rights, air pollution
abatement, and water quality”). For Posner & Weyl’s views, see POSNER & WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS,
supra note 10; Posner & Weyl, supra note 10.
16. Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 379.
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using private property to achieve environmental goals was anathema because
modern environmental law was often thought to require curtailing private property
rights in order to advance the greater good.17 However, starting roughly in the
1990s, “free market environmentalists” sought to popularize the value of using
property rights and markets to achieve environmental goals, arguing that these tools
would improve environmental outcomes while avoiding the problems of agency
capture and rent-seeking to which government regulation is prone.18 Several
decades later, many environmentalists have become more open to using property
rights and markets to achieve environmental ends and many innovative approaches
have been implemented to address issues as diverse as overfishing, wildlife
protection, and air pollution.19
A standard argument for creating private property in environmental
resources is that it will incentivize people to invest in caring for these resources.20
According to this line of argument, individuals act in their own self-interest and no
one will invest in maintaining resources such as ocean fish, clean air, or open
grazing land unless they have the right to exclude others from accessing the
resource.21 Without the right to exclude, there is no guarantee that one will reap the
rewards of one’s investment. Someone else can easily come along and take the fish,
pollute the air, or graze the pasture that one has tended. Thus, private property
creates an incentive to safeguard the resource by providing the right holder with a
right to exclude others . The incentive to invest is even stronger if the right holder
can transfer their right through sale, lease, or gift because presumably rights will be
more valuable if the underlying resource is healthy and plentiful. The ability to
transfer should also ensure that the rights are held by someone who is making the
highest and best use of the right, and the accompanying resource, because more
productive users will be able to purchase rights from less productive users.22

17. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 39-40
(2004) (“The premise of much environmental law is that private bargain and exchange in property rights
in the marketplace cannot be safely relied upon as a guard against excessive ecological damage . . . .The
government . . . . may need to limit the exercise of private property rights in certain natural resources.”).
18. Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 379-80; see also TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R.
LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 61-76, 121-32, 165-67 (1991) (advocating the use of
property rights to combat automobile emissions, acid rain, water pollution, overfishing, and to protect
wildlife and their habitat); VANESSA CASADO PÉREZ, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN WATER MARKETS
31-33 (2017) (surveying free market environmentalist literature advocating the use of water markets).
19. LAZARUS, supra note 17, at 183-84.
20. See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 18, at 3; TERRY L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP,
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 1, 86, 91 (2014); Grainger & Parker,
supra note 4, at 371.
21. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 12 (rev. ed.
2001); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
22. In legal literature, an article by economist Harold Demsetz is often cited for this argument for
creating private property. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Private Property, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347 (1967). There are notable critiques of the argument, including Elinor Ostrom’s that
communities can safeguard resources in some circumstances without creating private property rights.
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990). There also are other arguments for creating
private property or private property right-like instruments to address environmental problems, such as
the argument that tradeable rights are a cheaper way of achieving a given level of environmental quality
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It is understandable that the environmental property rights literature has
been concerned with promoting instruments that will induce better care of
environmental resources.23 Degradation of resources such as ocean fisheries and
endangered species habitats is the backdrop to proposals to establish tradable
property rights in these resources.24 However, providing individuals with rights to a
resource like a share of an ocean fish species or a quantity of water is not enough to
lead to those rights being used efficiently or fairly over time. The efficient use of
these resources means putting them to their highest and best use. There are
different understandings of fairness; fairness is often thought to entail distributing
rights equally or in accordance with criteria such as effort or contribution.25 Much
of the literature advocating environmental property rights has been concerned with
promoting efficiency.26 However, equity should also be a relevant criterion for
assessing the workings of the resulting rights because equity is important in itself,
and instrumentally for rights to be perceived as legitimate by rights holders and
non-rights holders alike.27 Although equity is often contrasted with efficiency,28
equity actually may be necessary to achieve efficiency, as people may not support
property rights and markets if people believe that they produce unfair outcomes.29
(such as a pollution reduction objective) than traditional prescriptive regulation. See SCHWARTZ, supra
note 2, at ii.
23. See generally ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 18; ANDERSON & LIBECAP, supra note 20;
ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 21.
24. See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 21, at 107-21; ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 18, at
149-51, 167.
25. For a well-known effort to elaborate on the meaning of “fairness” in the allocation of land, see
Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1027-68 (1993).
26. See generally ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 18; ANDERSON & LIBECAP, supra note 20;
ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 21.
27. Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 392 (“perceptions of inequity among entitlement holders
can feed resistance to reforms”).
28. Libecap, supra note 12, at 390, 408 (contrasting efficiency and equity in discussing water);
Grainger & Parker, supra note 4, at 373 (contrasting equity and efficiency in discussing fishery policy).
There is a tendency among the advocates of environmental property rights and markets to argue that
policies introduced to address concerns about equity lead to inefficient allocations of property rights.
While this may be true, it is also the case that without addressing equity, there may not be sufficient
political support for creating or maintaining markets.
29. While recognizing the importance of the distribution of income to welfare economics, Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue from an economic perspective for ignoring distributive consequences
in formulating legal rules and using the tax and transfer system to achieve distributional ends. LOUIS
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 28-38 (2002). However, others offer
economic arguments for considering distributional issues in formulating legal rules, at least in certain
circumstances. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998); Kyle D. Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax
Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003); Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the
Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1125 (2004); Zachary Liscow, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule
Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2482 (2014); Chris William
Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 797 (2000); Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); Lee Anne Fennell & Richard McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law
and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016).
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Consider three examples where environmental resources – specifically,
water, federal lands, and ocean fisheries – are the subject of some form of property
rights, but misallocations remain.
Western Water Rights
Starting in the nineteenth century, private property rights were created in
the right to divert and use freshwater across the American West.30 Most of these
prior appropriation rights have been legally transferable since they were created.31
Since the 1970s, economists and others have advocated greater use of market
transfers to shift water rights from agricultural to urban and environmental uses and
to adjust to variability in the supply of water.32 While there are some sales and
leases of water rights in western states, there are still few active markets, and there
is a widespread consensus that western water rights – and water – remain
inefficiently allocated.33 Agriculture is still, by far, the dominant user of water,
even though demands for urban and environmental uses are increasing.34
Economists, such as Gary Libecap, argue that there would be significant welfare
gains from re-allocating water through market sales and leases.35 As evidence, they
point to the much higher price of water when it is sold from agricultural users to
urban users, compared with sales of water from one agricultural user to another
agricultural user.36
Fisheries Catch Shares
Economists and others began advocating for the use of catch shares to
manage ocean fisheries in the 1970s.37 Catch shares provide their owners with

30. Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 387. Water rights were formalized in the twentieth
century in some places; they remain to be adjudicated in others, which complicates trading water rights.
Id. at 392.
31. Mark Squillace, The Water Marketing Solution, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 10800, 10801 (2012).
32. Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 379; Squillace, supra note 31, at 10801.
33. Libecap, supra note 12, at 389, 390, 396, 398, 399; Squillace, supra note 31, at 10805-06.
34. Libecap, supra note 12, at 391; Culp et al., supra note 12, at 10.
35. Libecap, supra note 12, at 389, 390, 398; Culp et al., supra note 12, at 10-12; Leonard et al.,
supra note 2, at 3-4.
36. Gary D. Libecap, The West Needs Water Markets, DEFINING IDEAS, (Feb. 7, 2018); Gary D.
Libecap, Institutional Path Dependence in Climate Adaptation: Coman’s “Some Unsettled Problems of
Irrigation,” 101 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 65 (2011) [hereinafter Libecap, Institutional Path Dependence].
37. Katrina M. Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 155 n.94 (2005) (tracing the history of the idea of individual transferable quotas to
a 1973 paper by economist Francis Christy, while noting doubts about this origins story). Individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) are a form of catch share. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration defines “Catch Share” as follows:
“‘Catch share’ is a general term for several fishery management strategies that allocate a
specific portion of the total allowable fishery catch to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or
other entities. Each recipient of a catch share is directly accountable to stop fishing when its
exclusive allocation is reached. The term includes specific programs defined in law such as
“limited access privilege” (LAP) and “individual fishing quota” (IFQ) programs, and other
exclusive allocative measures such as Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs) that grant an
exclusive privilege to fish in a geographically designated fishing ground.”
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shares of the total allowable catch that can be bought and sold, and therefore, in
theory, a stake in the ongoing health of the fishery. Catch shares now exist in many
ocean fisheries in the United States and other countries.38 One of the most wellknown catch share fisheries is the British Columbia, Canada halibut fishery;
individual transferable quotas, which are a form of catch shares, were introduced in
this fishery in the 1990s.39 In a co-authored article, anthropologist Evelyn
Pinkerton argues that many halibut fishing vessels are leasing individual quotas,
rather than owning them outright, from a class of “absentee owners” sometimes
called “‘armchair fishermen.’”40 For the lessees, “leasing is by far the largest
fishing cost and . . . operations become increasingly less profitable, the more of
their quota they must lease.”41 Indeed, Pinkerton & Edwards argue that “many of
these lessees are barely making a profit,” with “at least a third of operations . . .
either not financially viable or marginally so.”42 Compounding matters, many of
the armchair fishermen or their relatives appear to have acquired their individual
quotas for free during the initial allocation of individual transferable quotas, giving
rise to a perception that the allocation of the quotas is inequitable because the
armchair fishermen are benefitting from a windfall.43 The situation could also be
inefficient because without a long-term stake in the fishery, lessees may “act
differently than” quota owners and generate more externalities than the owners.44
The lessees might be more likely to “have higher bycatch rates, . . . to discard and
misreport catch” or perhaps to push regulators for higher levels of total allowable
catch because they need income to pay the cost of leasing quota shares and do not
have a stake in the long-term health of the fishery.45 The British Columbia fishery

Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Catch Shares, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/lawsand-policies/catch-shares (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
38. Christopher Costello, Tomorrow’s Catch: A Proposal to Strengthen the Economic
Sustainability of U.S. Fisheries 14, 17 (The Hamilton Project & Stanford Woods Institute for the
Environment, Discussion Paper No. 2014-04, 2014); see also Katrina M. Wyman, The Recovery in U.S.
Fisheries, 31 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 149, 173-74 (2016) (referring to various estimates of fish caught
under catch shares in the U.S.); Corbett Grainger & Christopher J. Costello, Capitalizing Property
Rights Insecurity in Natural Resource Assets, 67 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 224, 229 (2014).
39. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 14, at 708.
40. Id. at 710, 712.
41. Id. at 710.
42. Id. Cf. Bruce Turris disputes many of the conclusions of Pinkerton & Edwards, including their
point about the profitability of halibut fishers, and criticizes Pinkerton & Edwards for not identifying the
bases of their conclusions. Bruce R. Turris, A Rejoiner to E. Pinkerton et al., The Elephant in the Room:
The Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas, 34 MARINE POL’Y 431, 433-35
(2010) (disputing many of the arguments of Pinkerton & Edwards, including their argument about the
profitability of halibut fishers, and criticizing Pinkerton & Edwards for not identifying the bases of their
arguments).
43. Turris, supra note 42, at 435. See Corey Mintz, Seeking an Elusive, Expensive Catch: Quotas,
GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 6, 2018; Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 14, at 708-09 (referring to “large
wealth effects” from initial allocation method); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 39 (“grandfathering can be
inequitable”).
44. Turris, supra note 42, at 435.
45. Id. at 435 (arguing that mechanisms are in place to reduce the likelihood that lessees are
imposing greater externalities in the halibut fishery). Turris does not identify the possibility that quota
lessees might seek higher total allowable catches. Pinkerton & Edwards argue that there are
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is not the only catch share fishery where a significant number of fishermen lease
quota from quota owners who initially acquired their quota for free during the
initial allocation and no longer fish. Another example is the U.S. Gulf of Mexico
red snapper fishery, in which absentee quota owners are known as “‘sea lords.’”46
The concerns with the current allocations of fisheries catch shares differ
somewhat from the concerns about the allocation of western water rights. In the
case of the latter, the main issue is that rights are inefficiently allocated because
urban and environmental interests are likely higher value uses of some of the rights
that are currently owned by agricultural interests. In the fisheries context, the
concern is that some fishery catch shares have become inequitably concentrated
over time in the hands of a class of rentiers that actively fished when catch shares
were first introduced, but have stopped fishing and are now merely collecting rent
from lessees who are doing the physical work of fishing. The emergence of such a
rentier class also may be generating inefficiencies to the extent that the lessees do
not have the same incentives as catch shareowners to preserve the fish because the
lessees have a shorter-term interest in the catch shares than the owners.
Federal Grazing Permits
As a result of the Taylor Grazing Act passed in 1934, permits have been
allocated to graze quantities of cattle and sheep on federal lands in the American
West since the 1960s.47 These permits are transferable and treated like property by
ranchers and others.48 Economists have been advocating “grazing buyouts” for
decades and for roughly two decades conservationists have been seeking to acquire
grazing permits to end grazing on the associated federal lands that are harmed by
grazing.49 However, the free market conservationist buy-out strategy has not
succeeded. 50 Most of the permits – and the associated lands – remain inefficiently
used for livestock grazing. As John Leshy and Molly McUsic pointed out in 2008,
millions of acres of federal lands are grazed by livestock even though this forage

inefficiencies in the halibut fishery stemming from the leasing of individual quotas from quota owners
who received their quotas for free in the initial allocation. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 14, at 710.
46. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 41 (quoting NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., RED SNAPPER IFQ
FIVE-YEAR REVIEW (2013)); see also Brad Gentner, Gentner: It’s Time to Rethink ‘Catch Shares,’
HOUSTON CHRON. (July 7, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/GentnerIt-s-time-to-rethink-catch-shares-11274014.php (referring to “‘quota barons’”).
47. Hilary M. Hoffman, Demand Management, Climate Change, and the Livestock Grazing Crisis
in the Great Basin, 6 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 14, 21 (2016) (“After Congress passed the
Taylor Grazing Act, it took the federal government until the early 1960s to formally adjudicate the
grazing rights to all of the federal lands-that is, to apportion grazing allotments to the nearby landowners
and water rights holders in the manner that the statute required.”).
48. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 374. As explained further below, legally, grazing permits are
not private property protected by the Takings Clause. See infra note 77.
49. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 370; Robert H. Nelson, How to Reform Grazing Policy:
Creating Forage Rights on Federal Rangelands, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 645, 649-59, 667-72 (1997).
50. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7. But see Tom Ribe, Rancher Buyouts Are a Big Step Forward in
J.
(Jan.
1,
2016),
Preserving
Public
Lands,
ALBUQUERQUE
https://www.abqjournal.com/699237/rancher-buyouts-are-a-big-step-forward-in-preserving-publiclands.html (describing promising development in Idaho that will allow a “localized buyout” of grazing
permits).
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generates little meat or employment and harms the ecology of public lands.51 The
misallocation of grazing permits is reminiscent of the misallocation of water rights.
In both instances, urbanization, environmental change, and increased
environmental consciousness point to the need to alter the existing uses of
resources. There are property rights in place but the rights are not being transferred
to facilitate the newer uses.
This article now turns to the reasons why property rights in water,
fisheries, grazing, and other resources are misallocated, even though they are
transferable, and should, in theory, be able to shift through market exchanges to
more efficient and equitable uses.
2. EXPLANATIONS
In Radical Markets and Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly,
Posner & Weyl boldly criticize the existing concept of private property writ large,
as it is applied to land, intellectual property, and other assets.52 They draw on the
ideas of Henry George and the work of economists such as William Vickrey, Roger
Myerson, and Mark Satterthwaite, which are more skeptical of private property
than the Coasean-inspired advocacy for environmental property rights.53 Posner &
Weyl argue that private property as it now exists gives rise to massive and socially
costly misallocations of resources because private property owners have the right to
decide whether to sell a resource and at what price.54 This “right to exclude”
enables owners to thwart transfers of property rights to higher value uses.55 When
an owner has a unique asset, such as a strategically located parcel of land needed
for a new building in midtown Manhattan, that owner has monopoly power and can
use it to hold out and block the transfer of assets to higher value uses.56 Posner &
Weyl maintain that the problem of monopoly power is so pervasive that private
property needs to be jettisoned in favor of an arrangement where no one has a right
to exclude others willing to pay valuation of “their” resources.57 Under Posner &
Weyl’s new way of allocating resources, everybody would be required to place a
value on all “their” assets and transfer any of their assets to a buyer willing to pay
that value.58 To avoid people placing exorbitant values on their assets to deter
transfers, people would pay a tax based on their self-assessed valuations, which
Posner & Weyl call the “common ownership self-assessed tax” (COST).59 Fennell
offers a specific critique of the fee simple, the dominant form of land ownership,
which resembles Posner & Weyl’s critique of private property.60 Similar to Posner
51. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 369 (the forage generates “about 2 percent . . . of national
meat production”).
52. See generally POSNER & WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS, supra note 10; Posner & Weyl, supra note
10.
53. POSNER & WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS, supra note 10, at 34-52.
54. Id. at 38.
55. Id. at 62 (referring to the “right to exclude” provided by private property).
56. Id. at 32-34.
57. Id. at 38; Posner & Weyl, supra note 10, at 51-52.
58. POSNER & WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS, supra note 10, at 57.
59. Id. at 61.
60. See Fennell, supra note 10.
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& Weyl, she argues that the fee simple gives landowners the endless right to refuse
to transfer their land to new uses, which gives rise to a misallocation of land that is
especially problematic in urban areas.61 She points out that land needs to be repurposed in these areas, but adaptation to new uses is made more difficult by the
monopoly power of landowners to decide whether to sell and at what price.62
Posner & Weyl suggest in passing that environmental resources, such as
fish and grazing lands, are currently misallocated and recommend that these
resources, along with land and other assets, should be subject to common
ownership and the COST to improve their allocative efficiency.63 In their world,
“ranchers would effectively ‘buy’ grazing rights from each other at self-assessed
prices.”64 Presumably, the owners of catch shares and water rights would also have
to value them subject to a tax, and transfer them to anyone willing to pay the selfassessed value.
While there is considerable evidence that resources such as freshwater in
the West, grazing land, and ocean fisheries are misallocated, there is little evidence
that the misallocations are due to monopoly power on the part of the owners of
water rights, grazing permits, or fishery catch shares. Indeed, a 2017 report for the
Administrative Conference of the United States on marketable permits concluded
that “market power has not been a significant issue in most permit markets.”65 In
establishing some environmental markets, policymakers have included provisions
that limit the potential for monopolies to arise. For example, in “[m]ost” catch
share programs there are limits on the shares that a single catch share owner can
acquire of the total allowable catch.66 Even without such mechanisms for limiting
concentration of ownership, environmental property rights may not be as
vulnerable to the monopoly problem that Posner & Weyl highlight because these
rights and the resources to which they attach may be quite fungible – one ton of
fish is unlikely to be able to acquire unique value akin to a vacant parcel of land
located in midtown Manhattan next to the Empire State Building. 67 Conversely,
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. POSNER & WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS, supra note 10, at 72, 273.
64. Id. at 72.
65. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 81. In the environmental realm, Schwartz’s report focuses to a
considerable degree on marketable permits in air and water pollution and fisheries. In contrast to
Schwartz’s conclusion that market power is not generally an issue in catch share markets, Pinkerton &
Edwards argue that processors have market power in the British Columbia halibut fishery, in part
because they act as brokers for many individual quota leases, finance leases, and purchase the fish
caught under the leased quota. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 14, at 709-10. (Turris contests the idea
that processors have market power. Turris, supra note 42, at 434.)
66. DEP’T OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-14-019-1, REVIEW OF NOAA CATCH
SHARE PROGRAM 2-3 (2014). See also id. at 4, tbl.1 (listing accumulation limits in 6 U.S. catch share
programs); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 41, 82. See also id. at 82 (“most fisheries score low on the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for market concentration: the red snapper fishery’s scores were all below
190 ( . . . anything under 1500 suggests no market power)”) (citing NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
supra note 46).
67. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 74 (“marketable allowances and credits are more uniform and
easily transferable than many other commodities”); id. at 81-82. However, regulations might make some
catch shares uniquely valuable, by requiring different types of catch shares for a fish, depending on
where it is harvested. Daniel S. Holland et al., US Catch Share Markets: A Review of Data Availability
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water markets are one type of environmental market that may be susceptible to the
monopoly problem. As discussed below, prior appropriation water rights are often
not fungible as they specify a right to divert a certain amount of water at a
particular place and for a specific use, and changes in use are not allowed if they
will harm other appropriators.68 Thus, owners of some kinds of water rights could
have market power, for example, if they have the only rights that an actor could use
to accomplish its objectives.69 Outside of these situations, however, Posner & Weyl
may be correct that environmental resources are misallocated, but they may be
wrong about the underlying causes of the misallocations and the solutions needed
to address them.
Setting aside Posner & Weyl’s focus on the monopoly problem, it is
possible to draw out from existing scholarship on different types of environmental
markets three broad categories of explanations for the misallocations of
environmental property rights: the incompleteness of environmental property
rights, the transaction costs that interfere with transferring them, and government
policies such as subsidies that reduce incentives to trade rights in resources. This
section analyzes these three categories of explanations and then turns to the
political considerations that ultimately may account for these obstacles to socially
desirable allocations of property rights. Because many of the misallocations of
environmental property likely are rooted in the political clout of incumbent rights
holders, their suppliers and their representatives, changing the status quo requires
persuading the incumbents that reforms are in their interest – or the emergence of
new interest groups demanding the same resources that have the economic and
political capital to marginalize the incumbents.

and Impediments to Transparent Markets, 57 MARINE POL’Y 103, 104 (2015) (“Sanchirico et al. note
that restrictions on quota ownership in the North Pacific halibut and sablefish fishery result in 55
different unique types of halibut [Quota Shares (QS)] . . . and 36 unique types of sablefish QS, each of
which is likely to have its own market.”); id. at 108 (markets may be thin “[w]hen there are area
restrictions or other quota use restrictions on QS or” Quota Pounds, as in the North Pacific Halibut and
Sablefish fishery).
68. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 43 (“In the western US states, prior appropriation rights are
defined across the following characteristics: source of supply, amount, location of the point of diversion,
use, location of the place of use, timing, and point of return flow.”); Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3,
at 384-85; Squillace, supra note 31, at 10804 (water rights are often not fungible; “[t]he real obstacle to
fungibility . . . seems to be the uncertainty that the no injury rule brings to the transfer”); C. Carter
Ruml, The Coase Theorem and Western U.S. Appropriative Water Rights, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 169,
196 n.133 (2005) (“There is an opportunism problem in the prior appropriation system as a whole
because there are small-numbers conditions; empirically there is not a ‘rivalry among large numbers of
bidders’ to buy or sell water that will ‘render opportunistic inclinations ineffectual.’”) (quoting OLIVER
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26-29 (1975)).
69. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10804 (explaining that the uncertainty about whether a transfer will
injure other water appropriators is “[t]he real obstacle to the fungibility of water rights”). Large
institutional owners of water rights, such as large irrigation districts, also may be able to exercise market
power and block welfare-enhancing trades because they own significant volumes of water rights in the
West. See CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 50-51; Culp et al., supra note 12, at 16-17; Libecap,
Institutional Path Dependence, supra note 36, at 64, 74-77; Barton H. Thompson, Jr. Institutional
Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671, 728-31 (1993).
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2.1 Three Categories of Explanations
2.1.1 The Incompleteness of Environmental Property Rights
The structure of environmental property rights is likely one important
reason why they are misallocated.70 It is a basic tenet of Coasean-influenced
economic thinking “that the more defined property rights are, the more transactions
will take place.”71 Consistent with this, there is a pervasive ethos in the literature
advocating environmental property rights that the rights should be clear, complete,
and “secure” property rights.72 It is not easy to define what a clear, complete, and
secure property right is. However, environmental property rights certainly lack
many of the incidents of the fee simple interest in land, which is often regarded as
the ultimate in property rights.73
The prototypical fee simple landowner has a perpetual property right in a
parcel of land whose borders are reasonably well defined through fences and other
tangible markers or are knowable through land registry searches and surveys.74 In
addition, the landowner usually has broad rights to decide how to use the land to
which the right attaches.75 To be sure, the landowner’s right to use their land may
be circumscribed by land use regulation such as zoning, but constitutional
provisions impose outer boundaries on government regulation;76 governments
cannot take property rights in land either directly through expropriation or
indirectly through regulation without paying market value compensation.77
70. See, e.g., Culp et al., supra note 12, at 13 (explaining that “the nature of water rights
themselves” is partly to blame for the under-use of water markets in U.S. western states).
71. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 44. See also Culp et al., supra note 12, at 13 (identifying
three requirements for “an efficient system of property rights”: “(1) a complete definition so buyers and
sellers know what is being exchanged; (2) exclusivity, meaning the right to exercise control over the
asset; and (3) transferability, or the ability to sell or bequeath ownership”) (internal citations omitted).
72. ANDERSON & LIBECAP, supra note 20, at 75. See also Culp et al., supra note 12, at 29; Ruml,
supra note 68, at 169, 171-73, 183.
73. See also Libecap, Institutional Path Dependence, supra note 36, at 398, 400-01, 406
(comparing water rights to rights in land and ocean fisheries).
74. Wyman, supra note 11, at 6-7 (referring to the perpetual duration of the fee simple); THOMAS
W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13 (3d ed. 2017) (“Deeds to
land nearly always are stated in terms of some measurement of the surface area.”). But see Stewart E.
Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285,
1296-97 (2008) (arguing that it can be costly to obtain surveys and other tools for identifying land
boundaries).
75. Wyman, supra note 11, at 6.
76. Id. at 6, 8.
77. Prior appropriation water rights can be private property protected under the Takings Clause,
although it is not easy to establish a taking of water rights requiring just compensation. Squillace, supra
note 31, at 10803; Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W-NW J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 1, 26 (2002). Grazing permits are not considered private property constitutionally protected under
the Takings Clause. See United States v. Fuller, 93 S.Ct. 801 (1973); 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1976) (“the
issuance of a permit . . . shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands”); Leshy &
McUsic, supra note 7, at 374, 389 n.64, 391. Research did not reveal any case law on whether catch
shares are private property protected by the Takings Clause; law review scholarship suggests that they
are unlikely to be considered private property protected under the Takings Clause. Mark Fina & Tyson
Kade, Legal and Policy Implications of the Perception of Property Rights in Catch Shares, 2 WASH. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 283, 288 (2012). The Magnuson-Stevens Act includes language that seems intended
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In contrast, property rights to environmental resources such as water,
ocean fisheries, and federal grazing land are much less complete than rights to land
along the three dimensions of duration, definition, and breadth of use.78 First,
environmental property rights are often impermanent and/or conditional. Legally,
grazing permits and catch shares are time limited to ten years and revocable,
although renewal is standard and revocation is rare.79 Water rights can be
extinguished based on abandonment or forfeiture if the associated water is not put
to beneficial use.80
Second, the borders of the resources to which environmental rights attach
are often not as easily knowable as land borders. This leads to uncertainty about the
volume of the resource to which the right attaches that may discourage the buying
and selling of rights. Catch shares grant a share of the total allowable catch of a
given species in a given fishery; that catch level is often set annually by regulators
and can vary, making it hard to know far in advance the volume of a species to
which the catch share will translate in a given year.81 Grazing permits authorize
grazing of a certain number of livestock in a designated area on federal lands
during specified times of the year.82 However, the number of cows and sheep

to deter the courts from finding that catch shares are private property protected by the Takings Clause,
as it describes a quota share as a “permit” that “shall not confer any right of compensation” in case of
modification or revocation, and “shall be considered a grant of permission to the holder . . . to engage in
activities permitted by such . . . quota share.” 16 U.S.C. §§ 1853a(b)(1), (3) & (5) (2007).
78. The limitations on water rights are a major theme in the literature advocating greater use of
water markets in particular to address scarcity and variability of freshwater supply. See, e.g., Culp et al.,
supra note 12, at 13-17; Ruml, supra note 68, at 170, 182; Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 384-85
(“property rights to water are never complete”).
79. On grazing permits, see 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (2014); 36 C.F.R. § 222.3(c)(1) (1981); U.S.
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON PUBLIC LANDS,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/natural-resources/rangelands-and-grazing/livestock-grazing (last visited
Nov. 10, 2018) (“Permits and leases generally cover a 10-year period and are renewable if the BLM
determines that the terms and conditions of the expiring permit or lease are being met.”); see also Leshy
& McUsic, supra note 7, at 381 n.43. On catch shares, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1853a(b), (f)(1)-(3); Fina &
Kade, supra note 77, at 286; SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 25; Grainger & Costello, supra note 38, at
229, 233. The lack of legal permanence has economic consequences; research indicates that New
Zealand catch shares, which are permanent rights, are more valuable than catch shares in Canada and the
United States, where catch shares are subject to revocation. Grainger & Costello, supra note 38, at 22425. See also SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 23 (citing Richard Newell et al., Asset Pricing in Created
Markets for Fishing Quotas (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 05-46, 2005)).
80. Ruml, supra note 68, at 172. For example, in California, water rights can be forfeited after a
mere five years of non-use. Culp et al., supra note 12, at 16. In Chile, water rights are more complete,
and there is no requirement that water rights owners beneficially use the water for which they hold
rights. However, in 2005, Chile began requiring water rights owners to pay a fee if they do not use their
water rights. CARL BAUER, THE EVOLVING WATER MARKET IN CHILE’S MAIPO RIVER BASIN: A CASE
STUDY FOR THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER MARKETS PROJECT 4-5 (2016).
81. Nat’l Oceanic Atmospheric Admin., Annual Catch Share Limit Monitoring: Frequently Asked
Questions
2-3
(2015),
https://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sustainable_fisheries/acl_monitoring/documents/pdfs/acl_monitoring_faqs_j
an15.pdf (explaining that total allowable catches are established annually and describing how they are
enforced in individual transferable quota fisheries).
82. Technically, the permit is denominated in terms of “Animal Unit Months” which is a proxy for
the number of livestock. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 368. “An AUM is the amount of forage
eaten by one cow, or five sheep or goats, grazing for one month – or about 750-800 pounds of grass.”
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actually allowed on federal lands in a given year may be less than the number
permitted, “because lack of precipitation may restrict forage in some places.”83
Drought and variability in water supply also lead to uncertainty about the amount
of water to which the holder of a prior appropriation water right is entitled. Prior
appropriation rights include the date of the initial diversion or the accepted
application, or the priority date; more senior (older) water rights have higher
priority to have their claims fulfilled in times of scarcity than more junior (newer)
claims.84 The actual volume of water that can be diverted in a given year will
depend on hydrological conditions and the seniority of the right. Moreover, trading
in water rights might be further chilled by uncertainty about how much water a
right holder can trade. The amount that can be traded may be less than the amount
that can be diverted because the “no-injury rule” prevents a right holder from
making trades that will harm other water right holders.85
Third, there may be less of an incentive to buy environmental rights
compared with land rights because right holders tend to have less leeway to choose
how to use their rights than the paradigmatic fee simple landowner. A prior
appropriation right authorizes the diversion of a specified volume of water from a

Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 369 n.2. Robert Nelson explains, “The rancher’s permit specifies how
many livestock are allowed to graze the allotment and the precise times the livestock can be on the
federal rangeland. For example, a rancher in a northern state might have a permit to graze 200 head of
cattle on a particular allotment of BLM land between June 1 and July 15.” Nelson, supra note 49, at
663-64.
83. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 376-77 n.30.
84. Libecap, supra note 12, at 399; see also Libecap, Institutional Path Dependence, supra note 36,
at 69 (“Appropriative water rights grant usufructuary or possessory rights to a fixed quantity or flow of
water, usually measured in cubic feet per second, cfs, for diversion from a stream, based on the date of
the original claim.”).
85. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10804. Depending on how the right holder is using the water, a
good amount of the water diverted may be returning to the stream and thus be available to other
downstream users. A given proposal to transfer a water right to a new owner located elsewhere may
reduce the return flow available to downstream water rights holders by shifting the place, time, and
purpose of the water use.
Transfers by water rights holders may be chilled not only by the no-injury rule but also because
water rights holders in some jurisdictions may fear that proposing to transfer some of their water may
raise questions about the volume of the water that they are entitled to divert. Other water rights holders
in the same stream may try to argue that a farmer who is proposing to sell some water that they
conserved by installing a more efficient irrigation system was never entitled to that conserved water in
the first place because the farmer was not beneficially using the water when they were irrigating
inefficiently. Ruml, supra note 68, at 180-81, 189-90; Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 4, 10. California
has addressed this concern by specifying in a statute that conserved water “is not subject to the forfeiture
rule” and can “be sold, leased, or exchanged.” Culp et al., supra note 12, at 16. However, not all western
states have done so, thus potentially chilling water rights trading in some areas. Id.
Some proponents of water markets also argue that the public trust doctrine is a source of
uncertainty about water rights that undermines the incentive to trade water. To protect public trust
resources such as navigable waterways, state governments may seek to reduce the amount of water that
a right holder can divert; because the public trust is an inherent limitation on water (and land) rights
governments do not have to pay compensation when they reduce rights to protect public trust resources.
In theory, actors (such as conservationists) might be discouraged from buying water rights if they can
persuade state governments to shift water for free to the waterways that the actors want to protect, by
invoking the public trust. Libecap, supra note 12, at 406; Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 4, 9-10.
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specific location for use in a particular location.86 Changing the use of the water,
even without selling the water right, may require prior regulatory or judicial
approval because a change in use cannot harm the rights of other water rights
holders under the no-injury rule.87 Historically, the beneficial use, abandonment,
and forfeiture doctrines may also have discouraged some market transactions
because they circumscribed the authority of a conservationist-oriented water right
holder to leave water in the stream to protect the environment or secure it for
recreational activities such as boating.88 More recently, many western states have
taken steps to allow public agencies, and sometimes private actors, to own water
rights to protect instream flows, thus overcoming the historical problem that
passive uses were not considered beneficial uses.89 Grazing permits continue to
embody a “use-it-or-lose-it philosophy” because they must be used to graze
livestock.90 Generally, conservationists cannot buy the permits in order to protect
the permit’s associated land from further grazing because the permits cannot
legally be held and not used for grazing.91
In sum, by comparison with the fee simple interest in land, many
environmental property rights are incomplete along the dimensions of duration,
86. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 43 (“In the western US states, prior appropriation rights are
defined across the following characteristics: source of supply, amount, location of the point of diversion,
use, location of the place of use, timing, and point of return flow.”); see also CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., DIV. OF WATER RIGHTS, A GUIDE TO WATER TRANSFERS
3-2 (1999).
87. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1700-1701; Squillace, supra note 31, at 10801-02 (the noinjury rule “helps to ensure that priorities among water users on a given stream are not upset by changes
to the system instigated by an existing user or her successor”). But see Squillace, supra note 31, at
10805 (“farmers need no approval to change to crops that could cause far greater injuries to existing
users”).
88. Historically, the beneficial use requirement was linked with a desire to limit the ability of
speculators to hold water rights. See David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive
Justice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 20-22, 45-47 (2005) (analyzing the
history of the beneficial use requirement in Colorado water law).
89. JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 791, 793 (2d ed. 2009);
CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 57.
90. Nelson, supra note 49, at 664. Grazing permittees must own livestock. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b)
(1976); Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 382 n.46.
91. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7. In other words, outside of a few areas for which Congress has
passed special legislation, there is no ability to buy up grazing permits to protect the land and enable it
to regenerate comparable to the legal authority in some western states allowing private actors to buy up
water rights to protect in-stream flows. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 387-88 (describing
“exceptional” situations where “[t]he purchase and retirement strategy has worked”); Ribe, supra note
50 (describing support for purchase and retirement in Idaho). Indeed, one conservationist group
established “a livestock-owning subsidiary to hold the permits” in order to satisfy the requirement that
permit holders own livestock. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 382 n.46 (referring to The Grand
Canyon Trust); see also Nelson, supra note 49, at 657-58 (Nature Conservancy acquired option to
purchase a ranch in Utah).
The National Marine Fisheries Service appears to take the view that catch shares must be
owned by fishing industry participants. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 52. Catch share programs differ on
whether catch share holders must participate in fisheries. Id. at 41, 83. There is a prohibition on nonuse
of catch shares for fishing in at least one catch share fishery, although many U.S. catch share programs
do not expressly require that catch shares be used for fishing. Grainger & Parker, supra note 4, at 378,
383.
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definition, and breadth of use. That incompleteness may discourage the buying and
selling of these rights, and thus contribute to their misallocation.
2.1.2 Transaction Costs
The transaction costs involved in transferring environmental property
rights are another possible explanation for the misallocation of these rights.92
Some, though not all, of these transaction costs are related to the incomplete nature
of the rights.
Trading is more likely where property rights are identifiable, buyers and
sellers can easily link up, and prices of past transactions are available to guide
pricing of proposed exchanges. One persistent theme in the literature on
environmental property rights is the lack of publicly accessible registries and
clearinghouses comprehensively identifying the property rights, their owners, as
well as sales, leases and their prices. The 2017 report for the Administrative
Conference of the United States on marketable permits described “[t]ransaction
data for fish catch shares” as “spotty.”93 The National Marine Fisheries Service
apparently has not honored its own commitment to develop “a source of
authoritative market information and an exclusive central registry for permits”;
such a central registry also was supposed to have been established under the federal
Magnuson-Stevens Act “by 1997.”94 Holland et al. emphasize that the lack of
publicly available information about the prices of quota trades in catch share
markets is hampering the efficiency of U.S. catch share programs.95
The absence of registries of water rights and trades is also an obstacle to
re-allocating these rights through markets.96 Culp et al. recommended in 2014 that
92. For a useful definition of transaction costs, see CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 84 (“Three
types of transaction costs are distinguished: ‘(a) the costs of locating and attracting potential trading
partners and of pre-sale inspection; (b) contracting and fulfillment costs; (c) policing and enforcement
costs.’”) (excerpting M. Klaes, History of Transaction Costs, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS (2008)).
93. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 87 (providing examples of spotty data from the grouper, tilefish,
and snapper programs in the Southeast, and the Alaska halibut and sablefish programs). See also
Holland et al., supra note 67, at 103.
94. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 88.
95. Holland et al. suggest that there is generally a lack of publicly available information about
prices in the 14 U.S. “catch share programs” that they analyze, and that this may be contributing to
transaction costs and inefficiencies in the catch share markets. Holland et al., supra note 67, at 105, 109.
Pinkerton & Edwards argue that British Columbia halibut catch share owners and halibut processors
have superior information about the price of leasing catch shares and that this “asymmetric information”
problem harms quota lessees, contributing to their marginal profitability. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra
note 14, at 709. However, Turris contests their description of the halibut lease market, arguing that there
are “independent quota brokerage firms” and that “information on lease rates is readily available.”
Turris, supra note 42, at 434. According to Pinkerton & Edwards, halibut processors act as brokers for
catch share leases, finance lease payments for lessees, and purchase fish from lessees. Pinkerton &
Edwards, supra note 14, at 709.
96. See, e.g., CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 85-87 (analyzing the importance of registries for
promoting water trading); Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 16 (recommending “exchanges and
clearinghouses for water rights”). The following statement on the website of the California State Water
Resources Control Board provides an indication of the difficulty of obtaining information about water
rights holders: “We index our water rights by the name of the last known owner. However, we are not
informed by the county recorder, county tax assessor, or title company when property is transferred.
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states create registries of water rights that identify owners of the rights, and provide
information about the rights (such as the waterbody with which they are associated,
their priority, the water’s use, and the amount diverted) and recent transactions
involving the rights (including sale prices).97 These proposals for registries would
reduce transaction costs by making it easier to access information about potential
sellers and buyers and recent transactions.98
Another factor that complicates trading environmental property rights is
the need for regulatory or judicial approval of transactions, which increases
transaction costs.99 The literature on water markets, in particular, emphasizes the
significant costs, and impediments, to trades that are added by state law
requirements for ex-ante regulatory or judicial approval for rights to be
exchanged.100
The need for ex-ante regulatory or judicial approval of water rights trades
is linked with the limitations on water rights described above, in particular, the noinjury rule; ex-ante approval is required to ensure that no other water rights holder

Instead, water right owners are required to notify the Division of Water Rights when they transfer their
rights. This frequently does not occur. If a previous owner has not notified us that he or she sold the
property, there is a chance that the water right will still be shown under the name of the old owner.” Cal.
Water Boards, State Water Res. Control Bd., Water Rights, Frequently Asked Questions,
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_info/faqs.html#toc178761095 (last modified Jan. 15,
2019).
97. Culp et al., supra note 12, at 18 (“[S]tates should develop a central registry of water rights that
includes characteristics such as location (watershed), designation of surface or ground, priority, type of
use (agricultural or municipal), list of rights holders, diversion amounts, historical consumptive uses,
and recent exchanges, including amounts, duration, and prices paid.”). But see Squillace, supra note 31,
at 10804 (the information problem is not the complete absence of information about prices for water
rights, but that price information is “skewed by the limited number of transfers and the dominant
influence of the Colorado-Bit Thompson (CBT) market in the transfer picture”).
98. Culp et al, supra note 12, at 18. There has been litigation in the past about the disclosure of the
identities of grazing permittees. In 2009, environmental groups sued the BLM for violating the Freedom
of Information Act for refusing to disclose information about the holders of federal grazing permits.
Western Watersheds Project & Wildearth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management, No. CV 09-482CWD, 2010 WL 3735710 (D. Idaho. Sept. 13, 2010); Kristen Lombardi, BLM Fights to Keep Secret
Names of Ranchers With Grazing Permits, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Apr. 21, 2010),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2010/04/21/blm-fights-keep-secret-names-ranchers-grazing-permits/.
99. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 63.
100. See, e.g., Ruml, supra note 68, at 176-82; see also CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 65-66
(“The prototypical review scheme is as follows: the parties to the transaction file for approval with the
competent agency and it reviews the documents filed by the parties, which may include engineering and
hydrological studies. The burden of proof lies on the applicant.”) (internal citations omitted); Libecap,
supra note 12, at 404 (briefly describing transfer approval process in California). Bonnie Colby labels
the costs of obtaining regulatory or judicial approval for water trades “policy-induced transactions cost”
(“PITCs”). Bonnie G. Colby, Transactions Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 1184 (1990). Contrary to many economists, she argues that these PITCs may serve a
socially valuable purpose. In particular, they may internalize some of the social costs of trading water
rights that the parties to a transaction might otherwise ignore. Id. at 1184, 1186, 1190.
The text says that regulatory or judicial approval is required because Colorado, an important
prior appropriation state, administers water law through specialized water courts. RASBAND ET AL.,
supra note 89, at 790-91.
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is harmed from a transfer.101 State law also may require that transfers be reviewed
for impacts on fish and wildlife, and/or harms to the public interest or third
parties.102 “[M]any states” put the burden of satisfying the no-injury rule or other
standard “on the proponent of the transfer.”103 Because there are “uncertainties
about the scope and extent of injuries from a proposed transfer . . . parties on both
sides . . . hire experts to predict an outcome that favors the legal position of their
clients,”104 which adds to the costs of obtaining approval for transfers. The process
of satisfying the no-injury rule or other standard may also be protracted, thus
extending the timeline for the transaction, and potentially discouraging the use of
the market to reallocate water rights.105
Some of the transaction costs just discussed should be technically easy to
reduce. With the development of modern communication technologies, online
databases of price information and trading platforms could emerge – and to some
extent already are emerging – to facilitate transfers of assets such as catch shares
and water rights.106 To diminish search costs, online platforms could provide
information about right holders, their rights, and the prices of past transactions.
Stringent regulatory approval requirements, such as those that apply to trading
water rights, reflect political as well as economic concerns and therefore, are likely
harder to address.
101. In California, ex-ante approval is required to transfer post-1914 appropriative rights, but not
pre-1914 appropriative rights. CAL. WATER CODE § 1706; CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra
note 86, at 3-4, 3-7.
102. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 89, at 791; see also CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 73-74;
Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 5, 12-13; Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 387-88, 393; Libecap,
supra note 12, at 405-06; CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 86, at 3-7-3-10.
103. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10801. See also CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 66.
104. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10802.
105. Id. at 10802; Colby, supra note 100, at 1188 (including data on the amount of time it takes to
obtain state approval). In some states, such as California, the approval process for temporary transfers is
less stringent than for permanent transfers. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 68.
There is not much criticism that a regulatory approval process inhibits trades in grazing permits
or catch shares, but some form of regulatory approval presumably is needed for transfers to enforce the
use and ownership limitations. The process for transferring grazing permits appears to be relatively
straightforward, except when the purchaser is a conservationist and the regulatory restrictions mentioned
earlier apply. For scattered references to the approval process for transferring grazing permits, see, e.g.,
Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 374 (referring to “federal approval” of transfers of grazing permits
between ranchers); Nelson, supra note 49, at 663 (“When the “base” ranch to which the permit is
attached has been sold, the BLM has almost always transferred the permit to the new owner, although
the agency is not legally required to do so.”). There may not be much concern about approval processes
for trading catch shares because the trades can be done online through a system that automates
regulatory requirements, at least in some catch share fisheries. For example, in the Pacific groundfish
trawl fishery, catch shares and the poundage into which they translate are traded through online
accounts. PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., WEST COAST
GROUNDFISH TRAWL CATCH SHARE PROGRAM FIVE-YEAR REVIEW 427-428 (2017),
https://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Trawl_CSR_2017_MainDoc_Final.pdf.
106. See supra note 105 (discussing online trading of catch shares in Pacific groundfish trawl
fishery); WATER EXCHANGE, Water Market Price Data Now Available Through Acrevalue Westwater
Partnership (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.waterexchange.com/market-insight/ (announcing new database
with sale and leasing information about western water rights that is partly available online); Lewis &
Zheng, supra note 3, at 9 (discussing automation of approval of water rights trades in Victoria,
Australia).
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2.1.3 Government Subsidies for Resource Extraction
The lack of publicly available information about rights holders and past
transactions were presented above as increasing transaction costs. But the lack of
information might also be regarded as an instance of government failure, given that
governments are often well-positioned to develop registries of this information
because they approve transfers,107 and in the case of the catch share programs, the
National Marine Fisheries Service explicitly committed to developing a central
registry.
Governments may not only undermine markets in environmental property
rights by not creating registries of rights, but also through other policies that are not
directly related to establishing and facilitating the operation of the markets. 108 In
particular, government subsidies for resource use may encourage the holders of
environmental property rights to continue to engage in extractive activities such as
farming, fishing, and grazing when it might be more beneficial from a societal
perspective for them to stop and sell the environmental property rights that they
hold to others. For example, federal agricultural subsidies such as subsidized crop
insurance, price supports and disaster assistance may be discouraging water
trading, by reducing the incentives of agricultural interests, who continue to hold
most western water rights, to switch to less water-intensive crops or fallow land.109
While ranchers do not receive price supports, they are also subsidized through low
grazing fees that do not cover the cost of managing public lands used for grazing,
federal predator control programs that facilitate grazing livestock on federal lands,
and disaster assistance.110 These subsidies may also be reinforcing the attachment
of ranchers to federal grazing land and dampening enthusiasm for transferring
grazing permits to conservationists.
2.2 The Politics of Environmental Property Rights
Some of the hurdles described above to market transfers of environmental
property rights are due to the character of these resources. The precise amounts of
fish, forage, and water available cannot be ascertained long in advance, so rights
must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the variability of supply due to

107. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 86 (government well-positioned to develop public registry of
water rights and “past transactions and clearing prices”).
108. For an analysis of the roles that governments need to play to make water markets work, see
CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18.
109. Culp et al., supra note 12, at 27.
110. See Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 370; Katie Herzog, 7 Kinds of Government Subsidies
Those Angry Ranchers Get That You Don’t, GRIST (Jan. 6, 2016), https://grist.org/article/7-kinds-ofgovernment-subsidies-those-angry-ranchers-get-that-you-dont/; CHRISTINE GLASER ET AL., COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL PRICE OF LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS (2015); Todd
Oppenheimer, The Rancher Subsidy, ATLANTIC (Jan. 1996), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/1996/01/the-rancher-subsidy/306414/; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
LAND MGMT., BLM and Forest Service Announce 2018 Grazing Fees (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-and-forest-service-announce-2018-grazing-fees (2018 grazing
fee is $1.41 per AUM, down from $1.87 in 2017).
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hydrological, meteorological, or other conditions.111 Water uses are also highly
interdependent. Because one person’s diversion of water may affect the amount and
quality of the water available to others, western water law includes rules like the
no-injury rule to prevent one water right holder from making changes that harm
other rights holders.112 This rule gives rise to legal requirements to have trades
approved, which in turn contributes to delays that may discourage trading. 113
Indeed, because the amount of water that can be transferred without violating the
no-injury rule or other applicable legal rule may not be known until the end of the
approval process, the uncertainties associated with engaging in water trades may
outright discourage potential buyers from thinking about water rights purchases as
a means of satisfying their water needs. They may resort instead to “developing
new sources of water,” for example “from groundwater or water storage
projects.”114
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that there are alternative ways to
design rights to take into account resource variability and interdependence that
would lead rights to be more clearly defined, and therefore more amenable to
trading. For example, Squillace has proposed, and others have endorsed, the idea
that water rights should be delineated in terms of the volume consumed, as this
would eliminate the need for the no-injury rule that may chill trading. 115
So why have ideas to reform environmental property rights, reduce the
costs of exchanging them, or lower government subsidies for resource extraction
not been adopted? Inertia and path dependence are no doubt factors.116 But political
considerations are likely a primary reason as well. Many of the political hurdles to
reform are likely rooted in the political power of the incumbent right holders, the
industries that supply them with inputs, and the organizations that represent the
rights holders.117 For example, the limitations on who can purchase grazing permits

111. Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 383 (“nature of resource” has made it difficult establish
clear property rights in water).
112. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining the potential for one user’s use of water
to affect the water available to others).
113. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship between the no-injury
rule and ex ante approval requirements for water trades).
114. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10806.
115. Id. at 10800-17; Culp et al., supra note 12, at 15; CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 18, at 45; Leonard
et al., supra note 2, at 3-4. Trading consumed water would reduce the likelihood that a transfer would
negatively affect other appropriators because the trade would not be transferring water that is returned to
the stream through return flow. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10804-05, 10811. As an alternative, Bonnie
Colby recommends that states define an amount of water that can be traded “per irrigated acre,” and
impose on the opponents of a trade the burden of showing that this amount is inappropriate. Colby,
supra note 100, at 1191.
116. Libecap has argued that it would have been better if water rights had been defined like catch
shares as a proportional share of an “annual total allowable withdrawal,” rather than a fixed volume.
Libecap, Institutional Path Dependence, supra note 36 at 71. However, he recognizes that the historical
choice to delineate prior appropriation water rights in fixed volumes is difficult to undo due to path
dependence. Id. at 77.
117. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10802 (“Arguably, much of the cost and uncertainty associated with
water transfers is attributable to the resistance of the agricultural community to any transfers that
propose moving water out of agricultural use.”); Garrick & Svensson, supra note 3, at 395 (referring to
“the primacy of politics in the emergence, evolution, and performance of water markets” in the U.S.,
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that block conservationists from acquiring them seem due, in part, to the political
power of the trade association representing ranchers, the Public Lands Council, and
stakeholders in ranching communities, including neighboring ranchers and those
who supply ranchers with feed and other inputs.118 Conservationist buyouts would
reduce the number of ranchers and therefore diminish the constituency of the trade
association. If ranchers sold out, neighboring ranchers might lose access to backup
grazing land and feed and suppliers would lose customers.119
There also are less tangible concerns that transferring water rights, grazing
permits, and catch shares away from their existing owners would erode
longstanding ways of life and cultures.120 There is a great deal of concern in rural
areas that transferring water rights, especially outside the water basin, will
undermine the way of life in agricultural communities.121 Some of this concern is
rooted in experience, as long-distance water transfers have been followed by
environmental degradation of the sending area, and transferring water out of an
irrigation district could increase the costs that the remaining members of the district
have to pay for irrigation infrastructure.122 Ranchers and fishermen similarly fear
that allowing transfers of grazing permits and catch shares will harm their
communities and alter their ways of life.123 In some instances, legal rules that keep
environmental rights within the community and impede their reallocation persist
even though the rules appear contrary to the economic interests of existing rights
holders. For example, many ranchers are aging, and they accordingly would benefit
from opening the market for grazing permits to people with no intention of grazing,

Australia and China); Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 12 (“Large water transfers, transfers from
agricultural to urban and in-stream uses, and transfers across political and hydrologic boundaries all
threaten to reduce the demand for a variety of farm-related goods and services. Laborers, agricultural
processors, and suppliers of farm-related inputs lack property rights to water but are residual claimants
to the existing distribution of water use who experience pecuniary externalities associated with major
shifts in the location and nature of water use. As third-parties to the actual transactions that threaten their
livelihoods, these groups often resort to legal and political means to impair high-value water transfers.”);
id. at 13 (“Reductions in total fishing, fleet consolidation, and changes in the demand for fresh vs.
processed fish associated with the implementation of ITQs create pecuniary externalities for non-fishers
by changing the structure of the industry and potentially reducing employment . . . Stakeholders affected
by these pecuniary externalities have been a vocal source of opposition to fisheries reform.”).
118. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 371, 385-87.
119. Id. at 386-87.
120. Id. at 385-87.
121. See, e.g., Culp et al., supra note 12, at 13; Colby, supra note 100, at 1185, 1189.
122. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10807-09, 10816.
123. Leonard et al. draw the parallel between the opposition to water transfers and catch shares:
“The desire to maintain farming as a way of life is directly analogous to ITQ’s opponents opposition to
the consolidation of fishing fleets.” Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 12.
Consider two policy proposals that would address some of the concerns with water transfers. In
1973, the National Water Commission recommended allowing the buyer of water rights to assume
responsibility for the seller’s share of the costs of maintaining irrigation infrastructure, so that the
remaining irrigators would not face higher costs as a result of the transfer of water rights. NAT’L WATER
COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION 267 (1973). Writing in 1990, Colby
contemplated, but dismissed as infeasible, a tax on water transfers to account for the social costs of
transfers; such a tax might be more viable now in the era of big data. Colby, supra note 100, at 1190.
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such as conservationists.124 With more potential buyers, the price of grazing
permits might increase, and ranchers could use the proceeds from sales to fund
retirement.125
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of increasing the tradability of
environmental rights, reformers have struggled to overcome the political clout of
ranchers, fishers, and agricultural water rights holders.126 This is not to say that the
champions of environmental markets have not made any headway. The spread of
catch shares in U.S. fisheries since 1990, when the first major federal catch share
program was introduced, is an impressive achievement.127 Depending on whether
one measures by weight or species, 25% to perhaps 65% of fish are caught in U.S.
federal waters under catch shares.128 In introducing catch shares in the U.S.,
regulators followed the tried and true strategy of attempting to win over enough
support within the fishing industry,129 perhaps not surprisingly given the important
role of industry-dominated fishery management councils in U.S. fishery policymaking.130 As an example, catch shares were initially allocated for free to
incumbents in the fishing industry, based on their catch levels in baseline
periods.131 In some fisheries, “processors and other community members” also
received shares as part of the initial allocation.132 As mentioned above, position
limits also have been incorporated in many programs that set maximum limits on
the ability of fishing interests – and outsiders – to consolidate the industry onto
fewer vessels, although there has been a great deal of rationalization that has
increased the economic efficiency of fisheries.133 While it may have been
politically necessary to establish catch shares, there is a downside to adopting the
strategy of allocating catch shares to incumbents for free based in some measure on
their historical usage – which also, incidentally, is how prior appropriation water
rights were initially allocated.134 It reinforces the power of the incumbents in the
fishing industry and gives them a clear economic stake in protecting their interests
in the political environment going forward.
Perhaps, given political realities, reformers have no choice but to continue
to try to pursue reforms by adapting them to accommodate the interests of
incumbents with property rights and the array of stakeholders allied with them, or
124. Ribe, supra note 50 (“65 percent of ranchers are over age 55 and only 12 percent are under 45
years old”).
125. Id.; Leshy & McUsic, supra note 7, at 371.
126. See, e.g., Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 4-5, 10-14.
127. Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., supra note 37.
128. Wyman, supra note 38, at 173-74.
129. Grainger & Parker, supra note 4, at 377-82 (analyzing strategies used in implementing catch
shares to address distributional concerns).
130. Wyman, supra note 38, at 163-64.
131. Grainger & Parker, supra note 4, at 370 (“Free allocation has been the default method of
allocating quota shares in new ITQ programs in the United States.”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 11, 39
(U.S. catch share programs do not use auctions).
132. Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 12; see also id. at 14.
133. Grainger & Parker, supra note 4, at 375-77, 380; Ayeisha A. Brinson & Eric M. Thunberg,
Performance of Federally Managed Catch Share Fisheries in the United States, 179 FISHERIES RES.
213, 220-22 (2016).
134. Squillace, supra note 31, at 10803.
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insisting that the reforms are fundamentally in the interests of right holders and
other stakeholders.135 Still, in theory, there is a second way that reforms might
come about. New entrants interested in the same goals as the reformers might arise
that are sufficiently well-capitalized to displace the political power of the
incumbents.
Consider, as an analogy, the rise of Uber and its triumph over the
traditional taxi industry.136 For decades starting in the early twentieth century, local
governments regulated the number of taxis on city streets by requiring that each
taxi have one of a limited number of licenses to operate.137 These licenses could
often be sold or leased with government approval, similar to water rights, grazing
permits, and catch shares. The licenses were valuable where the number was
capped by local governments below the number required to meet the demand for
taxi services.138 With high stakes in the value of their licenses, the license owners,
and the financial institutions that serviced them by lending against licenses, largely
dominated taxi politics, much like ranchers and fishers and the interests that service
them have dominated grazing and fishing policy.139 For decades, economists
argued, largely to no avail, that limited licensing regimes capping the number of
taxis should be abolished on efficiency and equity grounds because the cap
excluded new entrants from an industry with few natural barriers to entry.140 In the
early 2010s, the most famous of these licenses, New York City taxi licenses, were
worth over one million dollars, and few license owners actually drove taxis; many
of the taxis on city streets were driven by drivers who leased licenses from absentee
owners like the “sea lords” who lease out their catch shares.141 Then along came
Uber which, backed by Silicon Valley investors, had much more capital than the
taxi license holders and effectively outmaneuvered them in the political process to
acquire the legal right to operate under a much less stringent regulatory framework
than the incumbent taxi industry.142 That framework does not require Uber vehicles
to have one of the limited number of taxi licenses, and so these licenses have
declined dramatically in value, as Uber and other app-based companies compete
135. This is the strategy that Leonard et al. seem to advocate, as they identify options for addressing
the political opposition to water transfers, from experiences introducing catch shares and air and water
quality trading. Leonard et al., supra note 2, at 16-17. Grainger & Parker also assume that “[f]ishery
reforms will probably need to be designed so that they are Pareto improving for all with stakes in the
fishery to enable ‘reform without losers.’” Grainger & Parker, supra note 4, at 383. There certainly are
good arguments that clarifying water rights by defining them in terms of consumptive use, eliminating
the limitations on who can own grazing permits, and establishing public registries of rights and
transactions would enhance the value of existing property rights, to the benefit of right holders. See
supra notes 90, 93-98, 115 and accompanying text.
136. See generally Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York
City Taxi Medallions, 30 YALE J. REG. 125 (2013) [hereinafter Wyman, Problematic Private Property];
Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2017);
Katrina M. Wyman, The Novelty of TNC Regulation, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON LAW AND
REGULATION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY (2018) [hereinafter Wyman, Novelty].
137. Wyman, Problematic Private Property, supra note 136, at 127, 168.
138. Id. at 127.
139. See id. at 156, 158.
140. Id. at n.121.
141. Id. at 131-32.
142. See Wyman, Novelty, supra note 136.
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with taxis for customers. The economists’ longtime goal of eliminating restrictions
on entry to the taxi business has effectively been achieved. The taxi industry has
yet to recover.143
While there are many differences between the taxi context and
environmental property markets, Uber’s triumph over the taxi license owners holds
a relevant lesson for thinking about the politics of regulatory change in the
environmental context. Just when the status quo seems immutable, a new entrant
can arise, successfully overwhelm the entrenched property rights holders, and
eviscerate the longstanding regulatory thicket that protected the incumbents. And
this can happen very quickly, even if the entrenched interests have dominated
policy-making for decades; Uber was able to obtain legislation legalizing and
regulating its operations in 49 states plus the District of Columbia within roughly
four years.144
From New York University in Greenwich Village, it is hard to identify a
new entrant that might disrupt the politics of water trading, grazing permits, or
catch shares, and perhaps these contexts are less susceptible to disruptive
innovation than the taxi industry was in the 2010s. But not many close observers of
the taxi scene were predicting that an app-based company would triumph over taxi
license holders in the years leading up to the emergence of Uber. The point is that
working to appease the incumbent environmental property rights holders may not
be the only strategy to facilitate resource transfers. There also might be an
“outsider” strategy involving new entrants that substitutes for the “insider” strategy
of trying to persuade incumbent rights holders to support reforms.
CONCLUSION
For decades, economists and others have been advocating greater use of
property rights and markets to address environmental problems. This advocacy has
had a major impact on environmental and natural resources law and policy and a
number of free-market environmentalist ideas are now mainstream. This essay has
argued that it is now time to focus on the reasons why environmental property
rights and markets have not been a panacea, by comprehensively examining the
property rights and markets that exist. In analyzing the problems that
environmental markets as a category have experienced (and not focusing solely on
water markets or catch share markets, for example), it becomes apparent that there
are clear categories of recurring problems and broad similarities in the nature of the
political opposition to reforms. This suggests that there also might be some broad
categories of reforms and strategies for achieving them. For example, as mentioned
above, systematically creating registries of catch shares, water rights, grazing
permits, and other environmental rights might facilitate more transfers by reducing
search costs.

143. John Aidan Byrne, 139 Taxi Medallions Will Be Offered at Bankruptcy Auction, N.Y. POST
(June 9, 2018, 10:55 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/06/09/139-taxi-medallions-will-be-offered-atbankruptcy-auction/.
144. PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURERS ASS’N OF AMERICA, Transportation Network Companies,
States with Enacted Legislation, http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/60841263#/60841263/1 (last
updated June 21, 2018).
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A second point that emerges from analyzing the problems befalling the
implementation of environmental property rights and markets is that the problems
undermining the operation of markets are not completely distinct from the “first
generation” issues encountered in implementing markets. Some of the “second
generation” problems impeding the operation of markets are the legacy of decisions
made in initially establishing the property rights and markets.145 Decisions made
decades ago to denominate water rights in terms of the amount diverted rather than
the amount consumed, to allocate catch shares for free, or to limit grazing permits
to livestock owners, all affect the operations of markets in these assets today. This
is worth bearing in mind while considering the design of new environmental
property rights and markets going forward. It might be desirable to avoid
replicating some of the political compromises made in the past to facilitate the
establishment of the markets. As an example, instead of initially allocating catch
shares for free to garner the support of incumbents in the fishing industry, perhaps
it would be preferable to initially auction catch shares while providing incumbents
with financing assistance to enable them to compete in the auctions.146 Using
auctions to initially allocate catch shares might improve the efficiency and equity
of the subsequent catch share markets by foreclosing the emergence of “sea lords”
who acquired their catch shares for free. Thus, analyzing existing markets may lead
to improvements in the next generation of new ones, as well as changes to the
current markets.

145. Libecap, Institutional Path Dependence, supra note 36 (arguing that path dependence helps to
explain why western water markets are not very active).
146. See also SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at iv (urging auctions for marketable permits).

